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Abstract. The integration of emotion and cognition in cognitive archi-
tectures for embodied agents is a problem of increasing importance. In
this paper, we describe how two separate modules for these tasks, as we
employ them in our virtual human Max, can give rise to secondary emo-
tions such as frustration and relief. The BDI-based cognitive module is
responsible for appraisal as well as reappraisal of elicited emotions that
our conversational agent Max becomes aware of. The emotion dynamics
simulation system is driven by the valence information of every emotion
and assures a general consistency of the simulated emotions over time
by dynamically providing an awareness likelihood for every emotion.
1 Introduction and Motivation
When trying to build socially intelligent agents, the integration of simulated
emotions into an agent’s cognitive architecture seems to be unavoidable. In our
work we follow the ideas of cognitive modeling with a cognitive architecture
based on the BDI-theory and an emotion dynamics simulation system based
on dimensional emotion theories. We further follow the ideas of [5] by distin-
guishing “primary” and “secondary” emotions. “Primary” emotions are elicited
as an immediate response to a stimulus, whereas “secondary” emotions are the
product of cognitive processing. Up to now our set of simulated emotions has
been limited to undirected, ”primary” emotions such as fear, sadness, anger and
happiness. After we validated a desirable effect of these emotions empirically
[4], we now want to let our agent control its own emotions to prepare him for
social scenarios, where the application of coping strategies is necessary. In these
situations the general limitation on “primary” emotions must also be overcome
by further combining cognition and emotion to simulate “secondary” emotions
such as frustration and relief as well.
In the next section, we will start with an overview of related work along
the lines of two major emotion research trends in psychology. In Section 3, we
introduce our virtual agent’s modular architecture and describe our approach to
simulate primary and secondary emotions as a combination of cognitive appraisal
and an underlying emotion dynamics. We conclude this paper by discussing some
advantages and possible drawbacks of our architecture.
2 Related Work
According to [1] at least two main viewpoints can be distinguished in modeling
emotions: cognitive theories of emotions and dimensional theories of emotions.
The well-known OCC-approach [11] to emotion simulation relies on rational
reasoning about the eliciting factors of emotions. Appraisal is the basis of every
computational emotion theory, but in the OCC model it is indistinguishably
intertwined with the cognitive processing of an agent. Despite its comprehen-
siveness and explanatory power, this model was frequently criticized, e.g., for
not taking into account the mutual interaction of emotion categories. Ortony
himself [10], however, has proposed later that it might be sufficient to simulate
only ten emotion categories and that it may even be adequate to start with an
agent that can only differentiate positive from negative, letting it evolve richer
emotional experience by means of machine learning techniques.
Initially Wundt [12] has claimed that any emotion can be characterized as a
continuous progression in a three-dimensional space of connotative meaning and
several researchers (e.g. [7]) have provided statistical evidence for this assump-
tion. These dimensions are commonly labeled Pleasure/Valence (P), representing
the overall valence information, Arousal (A), accounting for the degree of ac-
tiveness of an emotion, and Dominance/Control (D), describing the experienced
“control” over the situational context (PAD-space, in short).
We combine these approaches as they can complement each other in a rea-
sonable and beneficial way.
3 Simulating Primary and Secondary Emotions
Our virtual human Max is a testbed for studying and modeling human-like
communicative behavior in natural face-to-face interactions [6]. Max architecture
consists of a cognition module and an emotion module (see Figure 1).
The cognitive module builds on the belief-desire-intention model (BDI, in
short) of rational behavior. It can be divided further into a reasoning layer, in
which the agent’s conscious deliberation takes place, and a reactive layer, which
is mainly responsible for the agent’s unconscious generation of reflex behaviors.
Two major assumptions, as supported by psychology literature (e.g. see [9]),
are underlying our realization of a concurrent emotion dynamics simulation mod-
ule. First, emotions have a fortifying or alleviating effect on the mood of an
individual and an emotion is a short-lived phenomenon. A mood, in contrast,
is a longer lasting, valenced state. The predisposition to experience emotions
changes together with the mood, e.g. humans in a positive mood are more sus-
ceptible to positive than negative emotions, and vice versa [8]. This “emotion
dynamics” is realized in the first component of the emotion module labeled dy-
namics/mood in Figure 1. Second, every primary as well as secondary emotion
can be positioned in the PAD emotion space introduced above with respect to its
inherent degree of Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance. This assumption underlies
the second component of the emotion module labeled PAD-space in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. The mutual interaction of cognition and emotion. A stimulus is appraised lead-
ing to the elicitation of primary and secondary emotions. Emotional valence and dom-
inance values drive the emotion module to calculate an emotion awareness likelihood,
which is used to filter the elicited emotions. Finally, the aware emotions are reappraised
in the social context.
The emotion module [2] processes valenced impulses together with the ac-
tual degree of dominance as input signals. The valence information is driving the
dynamics/mood part by changing the emotional valence on the valence of emo-
tions axis. This leads to an increase or decrease of the agent’s valence of moods
indirectly, which is sent back to the cognition module as a general indicator of
the agent’s well being. Pleasure and arousal are derived from these values math-
ematically and combined with the actual value of dominance. As every emotion
is represented by its corresponding PAD-triple in PAD-space, a distance metric
is used to calculate an awareness likelihood for every emotion. For example, the
secondary emotion “frustration” can be associated with negative pleasure and
high dominance whereas “relief” can be characterized by positive pleasure and
medium arousal. The primary emotions “sadness” and “anger”, however, are
co-located in the same region as frustration so that in case of negative pleasure
and high dominance either anger, sadness or frustration might be elicited as
encoded in the awareness likelihood. This awareness likelihood is sent back to
the elicitation subcomponent of the cognition module and applied as a filter on
the primary and secondary emotions that may have resulted from the initial
appraisal processes. The actual set of emotions that the agent becomes aware of
(the so-called aware emotions) are finally reappraised taking the social context
into account. These aware emotions can influence the reasoning process on a
sub-symbolic level as explained in [3].
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We presented a cognitive architecture for emotion simulation that combines cog-
nitive and dimensional emotion theories. The BDI-based reasoning power of the
cognitive module is used to generate secondary emotions by appraisal and reap-
praisal, while on a reactive layer primary emotions are concurrently realized.
A possible drawback is that our architecture might suppress plausible mixtures
of emotions such as fear and joy occuring at the same time, e.g., when taking
a joy-ride in a roller coaster. The advantage of the proposed combination of
separate modules for cognition and emotion lies in the fact that simultaneous
elicitation of conflicting secondary emotions such as frustration and relief can be
successfully avoided.
References
1. C. Bartneck. How convincing is Mr. Data’s smile?: Affective expressions of ma-
chines. In User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, volume 11, pages 279–295,
2001.
2. C. Becker, S. Kopp, and I. Wachsmuth. Simulating the emotion dynamics of a
multimodal conversational agent. In Workshop on Affective Dialogue Systems,
pages 154–165, 2004.
3. C. Becker, N. Lessmann, S. Kopp, and I. Wachsmuth. Connecting feelings and
thoughts - modeling the interaction of emotion and cognition in embodied agents.
In Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Cognitive Modeling
(ICCM-06), pages 32–37, Trieste, 2006. Edizioni Goliardiche.
4. C. Becker, H. Prendinger, M. Ishizuka, and I. Wachsmuth. Evaluating affective
feedback of the 3d agent Max in a competitive cards game. In Affective Computing
and Intelligent Interaction, pages 466–473, 2005.
5. A. R. Damasio. Descartes’ Error, Emotion Reason and the Human Brain. Gros-
set/Putnam, 1994.
6. S. Kopp, B. Jung, N. Lessmann, and I. Wachsmuth. Max - A Multimodal Assistant
in Virtual Reality Construction. KI-Ku¨nstliche Intelligenz, 4/03:11–17, 2003.
7. A. Mehrabian. Framework for a comprehensive description and measurement of
emotional states. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 121:339–
361, 1995.
8. R. Neumann, B. Seibt, and F. Strack. The influence of mood on the intensity of
emotional responses: Disentangling feeling and knowing. Cognition & Emotion,
15:725–747, 2001.
9. K. Oatley and P. N. Johnson-Laird. Towards a cognitive theory of emotions.
Cognition & Emotion, 1:29–50, 1987.
10. A. Ortony. Emotions in Humans and Artifacts, chapter On making believable
emotional agents believable, pages 189–212. MIT Press, 2003.
11. A. Ortony, G. L. Clore, and A. Collins. The Cognitive Structure of Emotions.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
12. W. Wundt. Vorlesung u¨ber die Menschen- und Tierseele. Voss Verlag, Leipzig,
1922.
